This study evaluates the environmental efficiency of seven recently constructed ethanol plants in the North Central region of the U.S., using nonparametric data envelopment analysis (DEA). Environmental efficiency is measured and decomposed into its technical and allocative sources. Results show that, on average, plants in our sample may be able to reduce GHG emissions by a maximum of 6% or by 3,116 tons per quarter. The economic (shadow) cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions reveals that, at current activity levels, plants may have room for simultaneous improvement of environmental efficiency and economic profitability.
Introduction
The U.S. corn ethanol industry has benefited from government support due to its potential to achieve a rather wide set of goals: mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), achieving energy security (diversifying energy sources), improving farm incomes and fostering rural development among others. Continuation of policy support, however, is being debated due to doubts about the direct and indirect GHG effects of the industry. Central region of the U.S. The returns over operating costs (ROOC) 1 that may be gained or lost by plants as a consequence of the effort to reach a given environmental target are also calculated and discussed.
Materials and Method

Data
The environmental performance of a plant is evaluated on the basis of emission of greenhouse gases associated with its productive activity. Greenhouse gas emissions from 5 plants were not directly measured but rather calculated based on observable inputs and outputs corresponding to each plant. In addition concerns regarding the environmental impact of ethanol production refer to life cycle 2 GHG emissions and not only those emissions at the processing stage. Therefore we evaluate life cycle GHG emissions associated with observable inputs and outputs. Our observations consist of 33 quarterly reports of input and output quantities and prices from a sample of seven Midwest ethanol plants. Following the non parametric efficiency literature we refer to each observation as a decision making unit (DMU). Plants produce 3 outputs (ethanol, dry distillers grains with solubles (DDGS), and modified wet distillers grains with solubles (MWDGS)) using 7 inputs 3 (corn, natural gas, electricity, labor, denaturant, chemicals, and "other processing costs"). be differentiated by how much byproduct they sold as DDGS (10% moisture) compared 2 "Life cycle" in this case includes emissions taking place at three stages of the production process: corn production (farmers), ethanol production (biorefinery), and feedlot (byproducts from ethanol plants are given a credit for replacing corn as feed in livestock production). 3 Results of our survey contained total expenditures in labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs. As a result we calculated implicit quantities for these inputs dividing total expenditures by their corresponding price indexes. Labor and management price index associated to the Basic Chemical Manufacturing Industries was obtained from http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_325100.htm#b00-0002. Denaturant, chemicals and other processing costs were calculated based on the Producer Input Price Index for "All other basic inorganic chemicals", http://www.bls.gov/pPI/. 6 to MWDGS (55% moisture). Variation on this variable was significant, averaging 54% of byproduct sold as DDGS, but ranging from one plant that sold absolutely no byproduct as DDGS to another plant that sold nearly all byproduct (97%) as DDGS.
Ethanol Plants: Characteristics
Finally, Table 1 briefly characterizes plant marketing strategies. In purchasing input feedstock, five of the six plants purchased corn via customer contracts. Similarly, in selling ethanol, five of the six plants used third parties or agents. Byproduct marketing across plants displayed a higher degree of variance. Marketing of DDGS was split fairly evenly between spot markets and third parties/agents. An even higher variability was observed for MWDGS, where no one marketing strategy (spot market, customer contract, or third party/agent) was significantly more prevalent across plants than any other. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of inputs used and outputs produced by the 33 DMUs in our sample. As mentioned before the basic observations in this study corresponds to a plant in a given quarter; so two quarters of the same plant are considered as two different observations as are two plants in the same quarter.
Environmental Performance of Ethanol Plants
Emissions Measurement
No direct measurements of GHG emissions are available in this industry; however they can be calculated using engineering relationships. A number of computer packages have been developed to facilitate these calculations (Wang et al. 2007; Farrell et al. 2006 ). We used the Biofuels Energy Systems Simulator 4 (BESS). The BESS model includes all GHG emissions from the burning of fossil fuels used directly in crop 7 production, grain transportation, biorefinery energy use, and coproduct transport. All upstream energy costs and associated GHG emissions with production of fossil fuels, fertilizer inputs, and electricity used in the production life cycle are also included. Since these calculations involve modeling of crop production and feedlot and these display regional differences, BESS includes regional scenarios and an average scenario for the whole Midwest region. Plants in our sample are scattered across the Midwest and, hence, we have used scenario 2 in BESS "US Midwest average UNL" which is deemed representative of the whole region. 
Characterization of Potential Ethanol Technology From Individual Plant Data
Plants are constrained by a technology transforming a vector of N inputs
,..., , 2 1 . Observed combinations of inputs used and outputs produced   , j j
x u are taken to be representative 9 points from the feasible ethanol technology. In this study we use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to infer the boundaries of the feasible technology set from the observed points, following the notation in Färe, et al.
Observations from the technology consist of a sample of 33 DMUs producing 3 outputs and using 7 inputs. The production technology can be represented by a graph denoting the collection of all feasible input and output vectors:
The frontier of the graph GR and observed levels of inputs and outputs will serve as references for environmental efficiency assessment.
Environmental Efficiency Measurement
A given DMU (call it j) is deemed more environmentally efficient whenever it chooses a feasible (subject to the graph) combination of inputs and byproducts (DDGS and MWDGS) that results in lower GHG emissions while maintaining its ethanol production level at the observed value denoted by j Eth u . Fixing ethanol production to its observed level, and assuming variable returns to scale and strong disposability of inputs and outputs the graph can be denoted by: We define the set of all combinations of corn, gas, electricity and byproducts that result in lower emissions than those actually produced by the th j DMU as: GHG consists of all those points above the isopollution line as indicated by the arrows with direction northwest. 7 We denote the coefficient associated with ethanol by  =0.000316. Ethanol production and its associated coefficient are included in both sets. However, since ethanol is fixed at the observed level j Eth u , the complete version of the inequality is
which after elimination is equivalent to the expression in (4).
In Fig. 1 
The th j DMU could choose any alternative production plan within the area denoted by the bold lines to produce its ethanol production level, achieving a reduction in emissions while increasing DDGS or reducing corn or both simultaneously. In this study, Technically, we define this minimum feasible level of GHG emissions as:
Where   PROPOSITION. The measure of overall environmental efficiency, j g E , is related to minimum GHG in the following manner:
See Proof in Appendix C.
We can decompose j g E into purely technical environmental efficiency Overall environmental efficiency can be expressed as:
Therefore, we can define allocative environmental inefficiency residually as: 8
Based on the solution to the problem described in Eq. (7) Table 3 . The minimum feasible GHG for each DMU as defined by Eq. (7) is calculated fixing ethanol production at observed levels. 8 Environmental allocative inefficiency was illustrated in Fig. 2 by the distance between the iso-pollution corresponding to combination A and iso-pollution corresponding to point D .
ROOC and Environmental Targets: Trade off or Complementarity?
From Eq. (2) there is a clear relationship between GHG and the combination of inputs and byproducts. But there is also a relationship between combinations of inputs and byproducts and the level of ROOC. Therefore, in general, a change in GHG levels through reallocation of inputs and byproducts would bring about a change in ROOC. For a given level of ethanol production, the shadow price of GHG mitigation is the change in ROOC per unit change in GHG levels. The change in ROOC denotes the plant's maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for a permit to emit GHG. We define the shadow price of a ton of GHG as:
Where WTP is willingness to pay for changing emissions from 
Shadow Cost from Observed to ROOC Maximizing Allocation
We define the ROOC maximizing combination of inputs and byproducts (subject to a given level of ethanol production to make it comparable with the GHG minimizing combination) as the allocation that solves the following problem: Quantities of labor, denaturant, chemicals and others needed to calculate GR are obtained implicitly dividing total expenditures in these categories by their price indexes described in footnote 2. Prices for these categories in equation (12) are also those in footnote 2. We will denote the allocation that solves Eq. We define the shadow value of GHG emissions associated with moving from the observed allocation to the ROOC maximizing allocation as:
An alternative shadow cost to Eq. (13) is that which is incurred by moving from the observed to the GHG minimizing combination of inputs and byproducts.
Shadow Cost from Observed to GHG Minimizing Allocation
The GHG minimizing combination is computed by solving Eq. (7) with ethanol production fixed at observed levels and minimum GHG denoted by j GHG . ROOC associated with this allocation (calculated by multiplying the GHG minimizing inputs and outputs times their respective prices) is designated as j  .
We define the shadow value of GHG related to a change from the observed to the GHG minimizing point as:
Finally we consider the shadow value of GHG related to a change from the GHG minimizing to the ROOC maximizing point.
Shadow Cost from GHG Minimizing to ROOC Maximizing Allocation
Such a change is illustrated in Fig. 4 in the corn and DDGS space. In Fig. 4 
Results and Discussion
Environmental Performance of Ethanol Plants
Fixing ethanol production at observed levels, measures of environmental efficiency and their decomposition are calculated for our sample of surveyed dry grind ethanol plants and reported in inputs and byproducts may actually achieve this improvement and we will go back to this point in detail later.
ROOC and Environmental Targets
Shadow costs associated with moving from observed to ROOC maximizing allocations are reported in Table 4 . Given the rather large variability across observations both the median and the average are reported as measures of central tendency. Table 4 displays some observations that are unusually high and others unusually low. These disproportionate deviations from the average are due to changes in inputs that affect ROOC but do not affect emissions, i.e. labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs. These inputs are labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs. We classify as "outlier" any observation whose value exceeds the average by more than 3 times the standard deviation.
Since there seems to be a great deal of variability in shadow prices of GHG across DMUs we have plotted a histogram that shows the approximate distribution of these values in Fig. 5 . The histogram does not take into account those observations deemed as outliers. We have superimposed to the histogram a normal density function that smoothes out the distribution. An important conclusion we can extract from Table 4 and Fig. 5 is the fact that almost all DMUs reduce GHG emissions by moving from observed to maximum ROOC (negative shadow values). This suggests that, under our convexity assumptions, most DMUs (including the arithmetic average and the mean of the normal density function) may be able to increase ROOC and reduce GHG simultaneously which would in turn imply that these DMUs face no trade off between economic and environmental goals at current combinations of inputs and byproducts.
The fact that DMUs can rearrange inputs and byproducts in such a way that they can both increase ROOC and reduce emissions prompts the following questions:
 What inputs are reduced or increased and which byproduct is reduced or increased in such a rearrangement?
 Why are plants not exploiting these reallocations that achieve greater ROOC?
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The answer to the first question for the average plant is provided in Table 5 . The average DMU would achieve greater ROOC and lower GHG simultaneously mainly by reducing the use of corn, natural gas, and electricity per gallon of ethanol produced, reducing the production of MWDGS, and increasing production of DDGS. A part of these reductions is achieved through elimination of inefficiencies that would take the DMUs to the technological frontier but for the most part they are achieved through rearrangements along the surface described by the boundary of the graph, Eq. (3). Table 5 imply giving up MWDGS to increase DDGS and reduce inputs. They are feasible in the sense that they achieve an allocation already achieved by some other DMU in the sample or a convex combination of allocations observed in the sample.
Rearrangements displayed in
The answer to the second question is not as straightforward. As noted in the discussion of the first question our DMUs may be able to increase ROOC and reduce GHG mainly by reducing corn, natural gas, and electricity per gallon of ethanol produced and per ton of DDGS produced. 10 The apparent engineering (in)ability to maximize ethanol and DDGS yields when compared to other DMUs in the sample seems to drive the difference between observed production plans and ROOC maximizing plans for many DMUs. A note of caution is in place here.
There are many potential reasons for the failure of DMUs to attain the ROOCmaximizing allocation. First plants may not face market conditions that allow them to reallocate byproducts from dry to wet or viceversa. A rather significant livestock production relatively near the plant has to be in place for DMUs to be able to sell a 20 significant portion of their byproduct as wet. These market constraints are not captured by our analysis. Second the graph is assumed to be convex in our calculations. Under the assumption of convexity any difference in performance is attributed to efficiency differences rather than to technological constraints. However there may be indivisibilities in the construction and later modifications (expansions or contractions) of plants that result in non-convexities of the graph, i.e. scaling up or down of production in any proportion may not be feasible or may be very expensive once capital costs are accounted for. These non-convexities would prevent plants from choosing the ROOC-maximizing allocation depicted by the convex graph, rendering economic inefficiencies.
Shadow costs associated with moving from observed to GHG minimizing allocations, Eq. (14), for each DMU, average, and median are reported in Table 6 . Nine DMUs lose ROOC while reducing GHGs, thus facing positive shadow values of GHGs, meaning a cost. Seventeen DMUs increase ROOC while reallocating to the minimum GHG level.
The fact that the average willingness to pay for a change in allocation ( j j E    ) is positive while average change in GHG is negative, results in negative average shadow values. Table 6 indicates that the average DMU may be able to increase ROOC while reducing GHG which again seems to suggest unexploited opportunities to improve both fronts. In particular the average DMU may be able to increase ROOC by about $39 per ton of GHG reduced. The seventeen firms with negative shadow prices would presumably be willing to sell permits at any small price, since there is no ROOC lost from reducing their own GHGs.
Since there seems to be a great deal of variability in shadow prices of GHG across DMUs we have plotted a histogram that shows the approximate distribution of these 21 values in Fig. 5 . The histogram does not take into account those observations deemed as outliers. The presence of outliers is mainly due, as discussed above, to changes in inputs affecting ROOC but not GHG, i.e. labor, denaturant, chemicals, and other processing costs. We have superimposed to the histogram a normal density function that smoothes out the distribution. Despite the variability across DMUs, the highest frequency of shadow values (i.e. most of the "mass" of the distribution) appears to be located around zero. This means that plants are approximately efficient in the sense that they are operating at levels for which the marginal value of GHG is around zero which is, in turn, the current GHG price that DMUs face.
According to Table 7 Table 8 is plotted in Fig.   22 6. This histogram as the one in Fig. 5 does not take into account those observations classified as outliers. Again, despite the variability across DMUs, the highest frequency of shadow values (i.e. most of the "mass" of the distribution) appears to be located around a very high value.
The reallocation of inputs and byproducts that would take the average DMU from the GHG minimizing to the ROOC maximizing combination is displayed in Table 9 . The average DMU achieves increases in ROOC mainly through substantial increases in DDGS which in turn entails increases in natural gas and electricity, and reductions in
MWDGS. Another very important component of ROOC increases is reductions of corn
per gallon of ethanol produced.
Results for the average DMU in Tables 4, 6 , and 8 can be combined to recover the shape of the relationship between GHG and ROOC. Plotting the three averages in the GHG and ROOC space yields the graph in Fig. 7 . We denote the observed combination of the average by   Tables 4 and 6 . However, if the average firm were able to adjust inputs and byproducts to the ROOC maximizing combination, it would face an intense trade off described just above.
Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the merits and potential of the ethanol industry in the US by investigating the current environmental performance at the individual plant level, the potential for improvement in this performance and its effects on the industry's overall emissions of greenhouse gases. for a permit to emit ton of GHG, rather than suffer the ROOC reduction revealed by the shadow price of reducing carbon from ROOC maximizing to GHG minimizing levels.
The measurement of corn ethanol plants environmental performance, their potential for improvement, and ROOC/emissions trade offs conducted in this study should inform the debate on whether there is a place for corn ethanol as a "clean" substitute for gasoline. In particular our results suggest that ethanol plants in our sample can produce energy with considerable lower (52% lower) GHG intensity than gasoline. Moreover these plants have some room for reducing this footprint even more by reallocating inputs and byproducts. Such reallocations would achieve a 6.5% reduction in GHG rendering energy with a GHG intensity 55% lower than gasoline. In turn these reductions may be achieved at a moderate or none economic cost as strongly suggested by a negative shadow price of $39 per gallon. Further reductions, however, can only be achieved at high economic costs. 
